US Rare Earths and Autonomous Dominion

The contest is being fought not on a battlefield or in a data centre, but across mines, refineries and magnet factories that are scarcely present on US territory. Its central question carries major implications: can America command the rare earth elements needed for its future autonomous weapons, or will Beijing continue to control the supply?

Rare earths: the hidden foundation of autonomous power

Rare earth elements (REEs) are embedded in the equipment that underpins artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles and precision-guided weapons. These metals are essential to ultra-powerful permanent magnets used in drone motors, radar, sonar, electric vehicles and missile guidance systems.

China now leads at virtually every point in this supply chain, from extracting ore to refining it into high-value magnet alloys. That dominance gives Beijing considerable influence over US military preparedness and industrial capability.

In a crisis, a single Chinese export decision could stall production of US drones, missiles and electronic warfare systems.

US officials have tracked this vulnerability for years, and it is no longer merely hypothetical. China has previously deployed export controls on other critical minerals as political signals. Rare earths may be the next target.

The argument for vertical integration within US borders

A response increasingly supported in Washington is comprehensive vertical integration: creating each stage of the REE supply chain, from mining through to completed magnets, in the United States or among closely trusted allies.

Instead of viewing rare earths as an ordinary commodity, policymakers are increasingly treating them as strategic resources, comparable with nuclear fuel or advanced semiconductors.

Vertical integration aims to remove each foreign choke point, so no single country can hold US autonomy systems hostage.

Mountain Pass as a model

MP Materials, owner of California’s Mountain Pass rare earth mine, has emerged as the leading test case. It runs North America’s only operating rare earth mine and processing site, while seeking to move well beyond the basic extraction of ore.

The company is making substantial investments in facilities that can separate rare earth oxides and manufacture magnets in the United States. A new arrangement with the Pentagon is intended to speed up this expansion into downstream production.

• The US Department of Defense becomes MP’s largest shareholder
• A 10-year price floor helps de-risk massive capital spending
• The Pentagon commits to buying magnets for both defense and commercial uses

MP states that it has invested almost $1 billion in restoring a complete REE supply chain. Importantly, it has committed to ending shipments of concentrate to China, directing it instead towards domestic refineries and magnet plants.

Beyond mining: addressing the most hazardous gaps

Although mines receive much of the attention, the supply chain’s greatest weaknesses lie further downstream. China’s edge is most pronounced in refining, separation and magnet production, precisely the areas where US capability is weakest.

Shipping raw concentrate overseas for refining would simply swap one dependency for another, even if the ore comes from US soil.

Analysts caution that, without focused policy backing, the United States could develop new mines while continuing to depend on overseas companies for the most vital stages. This would leave important elements of the drone and missile industrial base vulnerable.

What lawmakers are being urged to do

Industry figures and security specialists are calling on Congress to give advanced processing and magnet manufacturing support equal to that provided for mining. This would include long-term contracts, research funding and closer links with the defence sector.

Stage of chain	Main US goal	Security risk if missed
Mining	Secure domestic ore supply	Reliance on foreign raw materials
Separation & refining	Turn ore into usable oxides and metals	Foreign control of critical processing
Magnet alloying & fabrication	Produce permanent magnets at scale	Choke point for drones and weapons
System integration	Feed magnets into autonomous platforms	Delays or cancellations of key programmes

Some supporters refer to a “Manhattan Project for magnets”, centred on co-operation between companies such as MP Materials, national laboratories and university research clusters. The objective is to surpass Chinese capabilities in high-performance magnets for stealth aircraft, space systems and autonomous undersea vehicles.

From physical materials to battlefield dominance

Securing control over rare earths represents only one part of the challenge. The other is how the United States uses that control.

Autonomous superiority requires magnets and metals to be transformed into large numbers of intelligent drones, loitering munitions and adaptive sensors that can be deployed quickly. Achieving this calls for an agile development culture that the US military has often found difficult to replicate.

Ukraine’s war has shown how small teams with cheap drones and quick feedback loops can blunt heavy armour and reshape battlefields.

Ukrainian units have drawn on improvised drones, open collaboration between frontline fighters and engineers, and rapid iteration. Designs can be created, trialled near the front and refined within weeks rather than years.

In comparison, US defence procurement remains shaped by slow, inflexible procedures, extensive requirements documents and programmes lasting multiple years. Such an approach suits large platforms, but not rapidly evolving autonomous systems.

A new development cycle for autonomous weapons

Defence strategists are advocating an alternative approach that combines vertically integrated rare earth supply chains with software-like agility.

A number of proposals are gaining support:

• Public design repositories operating under open but controlled licences, enabling US and allied start-ups to contribute drone designs
• Modular hardware designs that allow motors, sensors and software to be changed quickly
• Embedded liaison teams working directly alongside frontline units to trial prototypes and gather real combat feedback
• Procurement rules designed for inexpensive, frequently updated systems rather than decade-long mega-contracts

Under this model, a secure domestic rare earth ecosystem would form the foundation, supplying motors and magnets to a flexible innovation pipeline.

Politics, risk and accusations of “corporate welfare”

The amount of public support required inevitably creates political concerns. Critics argue that support for rare earth supply chains is effectively corporate subsidy for a limited number of companies.

Others fear that accelerating the mass production of autonomous systems could promote more hazardous military conduct, because the apparent human cost is reduced when machines undertake the fighting.

Supporters counter that relying on a geopolitical rival for critical components is a far more dangerous gamble.

The discussion is influenced by an unusual area of bipartisan agreement. Many Democrats regard domestic REE initiatives as part of green industrial policy, reducing pollution from inadequately regulated overseas refineries while creating skilled employment. Many Republicans instead stress the need to shield the US from Beijing’s leverage and defend technological sovereignty.

Key ideas behind “autonomous dominion”

Two concepts are central to this effort.

Vertical integration, in this setting, means placing every production layer-from ore extraction to finished magnet manufacture-under US or closely allied control. It does not mean that the government must own all of it, but it does require strong incentives, assured demand and stringent oversight.

Autonomous dominion means being able to design, manufacture and deploy autonomous systems at scale without depending on rivals for essential components or software. It combines material self-sufficiency with rapid innovation and trusted supply networks.

Taken together, these concepts point to future conflict situations in which fleets of US-made drones, satellites and underwater vehicles can be manufactured rapidly, replaced inexpensively and upgraded regularly, all supplied by domestic rare earth flows.

What if the US does not integrate?

Planners are concerned by several credible scenarios. One involves a crisis in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea, followed by Chinese export controls on particular rare earths required for high-performance magnets. Within months, production lines for US drones and missile systems could slow dramatically.

A more subtle danger is that US companies delay investment in advanced REE processing because policy support appears unreliable. Capacity would then expand abroad, often in countries more prepared to make agreements with Beijing. The United States could retain mines, yet the economic and technological gains would accrue elsewhere.

Conversely, successful vertical integration could have effects extending far beyond defence. The same magnets are used in wind turbines, electric cars and medical equipment. Shared production capacity could reduce costs and broaden industrial choices, although it might also intensify local environmental and planning disputes over new mines and refineries.